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Response to: Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawlingfor Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal 
Borrowing and Convergence, 111 Colurn. L. Rev. 670 (2011). 
Though she provides ample analysis for most of her many insights in 
Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 
Professor Laurin never actually explains her article's title. I Curious readers 
may well wonder exactly what it means to "trawl" for Herring. Is this just a 
simple pun on hapless Bennie Dean Herring's name, or is there more to it? At 
the risk of ruining a good joke, I suggest that "trawling" is in fact a 
conceptually significant metaphor that helpfully illuminates the "lessons in 
doctrinal borrowing and convergence" heralded in Laurin's subtitle. Indeed, 
the trawling metaphor builds upon a second water-based metaphor-the 
"hydraulics" of borrowing and convergence-that together animate Laurin's 
bold theses about the true origins and future trajectory of contemporary 
exclusionary rule doctrine. 
Laurin's inquiry into exclusionary rule hydraulics seeks to clarify an 
otherwise puzzling decision-Herring v. United States.2 Although Chief 
Justice Roberts professed fidelity to precedent in his majority opinion, 
Professor Laurin maintains that Chief Justice Roberts's opinion brought 
innovations to exclusionary rule jurisprudence that cannot be satisfactorily 
justified by citation to the mainline of prior exclusionary rule case law. 
Specifically, Laurin argues that cases in the Mapp-Leon line do not warrant (1) 
the tying of the exclusionary rule to heightened police culpability or (2) the 
adoption of an exclusionary rule test expressly aimed at institutional rather 
, Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. The images in this Response were 
generated using custom software implementing the author's information design. Darren 
Kumasawa designed and implemented the software architecture. 1 am deeply grateful to Darren 
for his incredible work. T am also grateful to Jennifer Laurin and the editors at the Columbia Law 
Review for providing me with this opportunity. Thanks are also owed to Amanda Webster for 
research assistance. Of course, all errors are mine. 
I. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, III Colum. L. Rev. 670 (20 II). 
2. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
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than individual misconduct.3 While blunt in her critique, Laurin does not 
charge Chief Justice Roberts with improper departure from precedent. Rather, 
she postulates that "much of what Herring appears to leave unexplained may 
be illuminated by recovering the influence of constitutional tort doctrine on the 
exclusionary rule's lineage."4 Laurin then undertakes to recover the 
exclusionary rule doctrine's lost lineage precisely by trawling through the 
waters-to use her unexplained metaphor-of constitutional tort doctrine. 
In this Response, I explore Laurin's project of recovering the exclusionary 
rule's lost lineage through critical reflection upon her doctrinal metaphors. I 
attend to both Laurin's specific exclusionary rule arguments and to how 
Laurin's conceptualization of hydraulics extends Professors Tebbe and Tsai's 
general thesis on constitutional borrowing.5 To facilitate this analysis, I deploy 
my own series of visual metaphors in the form of opinion maps that chart the 
flow of relevant Supreme Court doctrine.6 Part I provides necessary doctrinal 
background by mapping Laurin's account of how the "good faith exception" to 
the exclusionary rule borrowed from constitutional tort jurisprudence. Part IT 
maps Laurin's major arguments regarding the origins of Herring's heightened 
culpability requirement and systemic negligence standard in the qualified 
immunity and entity liability branches of constitutional tort doctrine. Part TIT 
suggests that Laurin's account could be sharpened by examining the vital role 
dissents have played in shaping the competing judicial schools in exclusionary 
rule doctrine. Here, I map an alternate account of Herring's origins that 
emphasizes the place of dissents in competing lines of doctrinal thought. In the 
conclusion, I reflect briefly on how the Court's hot-off-the-presses 
exclusionary rule case Davis v. United States 7 implicates my analysis. 
I. IDENTIFYING BORROWING: THE "GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION" TO THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Professor Laurin's recovery of the exclusionary rule's lost lineage begins 
with an account of the Court's adoption of the "good faith exception" to the 
exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon.8 In Leon, the Court denied the 
suppression remedy to criminal defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated by the "reasonable" execution of warrants that nonetheless 
lacked probable cause.9 In his majority opinion, Justice White made a 
profound, but potentially puzzling, citation to the then-recently announced 
"objective good faith" qualified immunity standard applicable in constitutional 
3. Laurin, supra note I, at 679,683. 
4. Id. at 677. 
5. See generally Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 Mich. L. 
Rev. 459 (20 I 0) (defining and analyzing constitutional borrowing practice). 
6. I have explained the theory behind these maps in great length in an earlier work. See 
generally Colin Starger, Exile on Main Street: Competing Traditions and Due Process Dissent, 95 
Marq. L. Rev. (forthcoming Summer 2012). draft available at 
http://papers.ssm.comlsoI3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1808984 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
7. 131 S.Ct.2419(2011). 
8. 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Laurin, supra note 1, at 680. 
9. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-21. 
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tort litigation. I a The potential puzzle stems from the fact that Justice White 
provided virtually no justification for his resort to a legal doctrine that was 
outside the entire realm of criminal law and criminal procedure remedies. Yet 
Justice White's move becomes coherent, argues Laurin, if understood as 
exemplifying Tebbe and Tsai's notion of borrowing. 
Figure 1 below distills Laurin's account of Leon's borrowing into an 
opinion map.l1 Each plotted point (triangle or circle) represents a Supreme 
Court opinion-the case name appears above the opinion and the opinion 
author appears below. Triangles represent exclusionary rule opinions, and 
circles represent qualified immunity decisions. The map's X-axis shows the 
year the opinion was issued while the Y-axis supplies the number of votes cast 
in support of the opinion-opinions above the dashed line are thus majority 
opinions while opinions below that line are dissents. Solid arrows joining 
opinions indicate that the latter opinion directly cited the earlier one. The map 
therefore shows that, in 1984, Justice White's opinion for the Court in Leon 
commanded six votes and directly cited to three other opinions-Justice 
10. See id. at 922-23 & n.23 ("[T]he officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause 
determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively 
reasonable." (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982»). 
11. Figure 1 distills the account from Part 11.A-B of Trawling. See Laurin, supra note 1, at 
689-99 (exploring circumstances that prompted and sustained impact of Leon's borrowing). Tn 
chronological order, the data points on the map are: 
(1) Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
Wolf was a 6-3 decision. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice 
Black concurred. Justice Douglas dissented. Justice Murphy, with whom Justice Rutledge 
joined, dissented. Justice Rutledge, with whom Justice Murphy joined, also wrote a separate 
dissent. 
(2) Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe was an 8-1 decision. Justice Douglas 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Harlan, with whom Justice Stewart joined, 
concurred. Justice Frankfurter dissented. 
(3) Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. Mapp was a 6-3 decision. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the 
Court. Justice Black concurred. Justice Douglas wrote a second concurrence. Justice Stewart 
concurred with the judgment and wrote a memorandum opinion. (Since Justice Stewart's 
memorandum opinion explicitly agreed with Justice Harlan's dissent, 1 do not count it as a 
vote for Justice Clark's majority opinion). Justice Harlan, with whom Justices Frankfurter 
and Whittaker joined, dissented. 
(4) Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Pierson was an 8-1 decision. Chief Justice Warren 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Douglas dissented. 
(5) Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). Bivens was a 6-3 decision. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Justice Harlan concurred with the judgment only. Chief Justice Burger dissented. Justice 
Black dissented separately. Justice Blackmun wrote a third dissent. 
(6) United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Calandra was a 6-3 decision. Justice 
Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Douglas and 
Marshall joined, dissented. 
(7) Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Stone was a 6-3 decision. Justice Powell delivered 
the opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, dissented. 
Justice White dissented separately. 
(8) Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Harlow was an 8-1 decision. Justice Powell 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Burger dissented. 
(9) Leon, 468 U.S. 897. Leon was a 6-3 decision. Justice White delivered the opinion of the 
Court. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, dissented. Justice Stevens filed 
a separate dissent. 
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Powell's majority opinion in United States v. Calandra, Justice White's own 
dissent in Stone v. Powell, and Justice Powell's majority opinion from the 
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Figure 1 
Figure 1 helpfully illustrates the water metaphor implied by trawling and 
hydraulics. By this trope, Laurin invites us to conceive of doctrine as a river 
that has its source in different tributaries. In the quest to capture Herring's 
meaning, we must not cast our nets exclusively in the primary tributary of red 
exclusionary rule line cases. The green waters of qualified immunity also 
contribute to the flow of exclusionary rule doctrine. This basic work 
accomplished by the trawling metaphor is thus fairly simple to draw out. 
Figures 2 and 3 chart more complex concepts and depict the hydraulics of 
borrowing and convergence. 
Before moving on from Figure I, however, two map features require brief 
explanation. First, Justice Clark's seminal Mapp v. Ohio opinion is represented 
as a blue triangle pointing upwards because it expanded the exclusionary rule 
remedy. By contrast, all the red triangles pointing downwards represent 
restrictions on the remedy. So Wolf v. Colorado restricted the exclusionary rule 
by holding that state courts did not need to suppress evidence obtained through 
unreasonable search or seizure, but Mapp expanded the exclusionary rule by 
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overruling Wolfl2 Second, the arrow from Calandra to Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics is dotted rather than solid 
because Justice Powell's opinion did not formally cite to Chief Justice 
Burger's dissent. Despite this absence of direct citation (represented on the 
map by solid arrows), Laurin connects the two opinions in her account because 
the Calandra Court implicitly adopted the premise of Chief Justice Burger's 
Bivens salvo. 13 I call such implicit connections between opmlOns 
"hermeneutic" because hermeneutic connections require interpretation of 
doctrinal context in addition to literal reading of opinion text. As I shall argue, 
dissents have played an important hermeneutic role in articulating competing 
visions of exclusionary rule doctrine. 
II. TRAWLING FOR HERRING: HEIGHTENED CULPABILITY AND SYSTEMIC 
NEGLIGENCE 
Returning now to the exclusionary rule's lost lineage, Figures 2 and 3 
depict Trawling's major theses regarding the origins of Chief Justice Roberts's 
two most controversial moves in Herring. Figure 2 maps the main tributaries to 
Herring's new culpability test. 14 Figure 3 charts the opinions upstream from 
Chief Justice Roberts's turn to a systemic negligence standard.15 Tn both maps, 
12. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55 (overruling Wolf, 338 U.S. 25). 
13. Laurin, supra note 1, at 693. 
14. Figure 2 distills the argument from Part lll.A of Trawling. Id. at 725-32 (arguing 
application of objective reasonableness standard "has forayed into increasingly culpability-
focused terrain that has challenged conventional distinctions between objective and subjective 
legal inquiries"). In chronological order, the data points on the map are: 
(I) Pierson, 386 U.S. 547. For Pierson's vote breakdown, see supra note II. 
(2) Harlow, 457 U.S. 800. For Harlow's vote breakdown, see supra note 11. 
(3) Leon, 468 U.S. 897. For Leon's vote breakdown, see supra note 11. 
(4) Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). Malley was a 7-2 decision. Justice White 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Powell, with whom Justice Rehnquist joined, 
concurred in part and dissented in part. 
(5) Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). Krull was a 5-4 decision. Justice Blackmun 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens joined, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Marshall filed a separate 
dissenting opinion. 
(6) Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Anderson was a 6-3 decision. Justice Scalia 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Brennan and 
Marshall joined, filed a dissenting opinion. 
(7) Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). Evans was a 7-2 decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote the majority opinion. Justice O'Connor, with whom Justices Souter and Breyer joined, 
filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens joined, filed a 
dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens also wrote a separate solo dissent. 
(8) Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). Herring was a 5-4 decision. Chief 
Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined, dissented. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter 
joined, also wrote a separate dissent. 
15. Figure 3 distills the argument from Part m.B of Trawling. See Laurin, supra note I, at 
732-39 (querying "[w]hat quantam of error will qualify as 'systemic' for purposes of invoking 
the exclusionary rule"). In chronological order, the data points on the map are: 
(I) Monroe, 365 U.S. 167. For Monroe's vote breakdown, see supra note II. 
(2) Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell was a 7-2 decision. Justice 
Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Stevens concurred in part. Justice 
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the familiar red and green currents can be seen to converge and move together. 
This convergence occurs after the initial borrowing in Leon and involves 
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Figure 2 shows how Malley v. Briggs and Anderson v. Creighton, both 
qualified immunity cases, directly borrowed back from Leon. Laurin argues 
Rehnquist, with whom Chief Justice Burger joined, dissented. 
(3) Leon, 468 U.S. 897. For Leon's vote breakdown, see supra note 11. 
(4) Krull, 480 U.S. 340. For Krull's vote breakdown, see supra note 14. 
(5) City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). City of Canton was a 6-3 decision. Justice 
White delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion. Justice 
O'Connor, with whom Justices Kennedy and Scalia joined, tiled an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
(6) Evans, 514 U.S. at 1. For Evans's vote breakdown, see supra note 14. 
(7) Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). Brown was a 5-4 decision. Justice 
O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and 
Breyer joined, dissented. Justice Breyer, with whom Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined, 
dissented. 
(8) Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). Hudson was a 5-4 decision. Justice Scalia 
delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and 
concurring with the judgment. Justice Breyer, with whom Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg joined, dissented. 
(9) Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 695. For Herring's vote breakdown, see supra note 14. 
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that this borrowing back helped justify a progressive ratcheting-up of the 
showing actually required to deem official conduct "umeasonable" under 
Harlow's "objective reasonableness" standard. 16 In turn, Herring effectively 
brought the exclusionary rule "formally into line with the contours of the 
qualified immunity doctrine as it has been applied since Malley and 
Anderson." 17 Since "Herring did not acknowledge any debt to qualified 
immunity doctrine in setting its gross negligence baseline," 18 the arrow from 
Herring back to Anderson is dotted, signifying a hermeneutic connection. 
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Figure 3 depicts a similar interplay between Monell-line constitutional tort 
cases and the exclusionary rule mainline. Laurin argues that Herring's ruling 
that suppression only remedies constitutional harm attributable to system-level 
failure is "resonant with the Court's post-Monell approach to entity-based 
liability under § 1983."20 This resonance is signaled by Herring's direct 
16. Laurin, supra note I, at 725-26. 
17. ld. at 726. 
18.ld.at727. 
19. See id. at 7l0-11 (noting Krull "implicitly reiterated" Malley's objective reasonableness 
standard). 
20. ld. at 732. 
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citation to the concurrences of Justice Kennedy in Hudson v. Michigan and 
Justice O'Connor in Arizona v. Evans.2l However, the real resonance of those 
mainstream exclusionary rule opinions turns on their implicit connections to 
Justice O'Connor's insistence on patterns of constitutional violations to 
establish torts in the Monell-branch cases Board of County Commissioners v. 
Brown and City of Canton v. Harris. 22 
Beyond identifying specific instances of doctrinal convergence, Laurin 
seeks to understand the more general phenomenon. At this higher level of 
abstraction, convergence builds upon Tebbe and Tsai's borrowing analysis and 
can usefully serve scholars exploring realms other than the jurisprudence of the 
Fourth Amendment or constitutional torts. Though Laurin sees convergence as 
"distinct in its operation and effect from the initial act of borrowing,"23 she 
stresses how the dynamics are inherently intertwined: "Borrowing sets the 
stage for convergence by supplying advocates and judges with additional 
strategic motivation (beyond what first prompted borrowing), jurisprudential 
warrant, and habits of mind that drive further exploration of ties between the 
source and target doctrines."24 It is precisely this back-and-forth relationship 
between borrowing and convergence that Laurin calls hydraulic. This striking 
and compelling metaphor works on different levels. 
Hydraulics evokes an extremely complex mathematics of cause and 
effect. Where rivers meet, swirling eddies do not begin or end clearly. 
Riverbed topography and other environmental contexts complicate efforts to 
accurately quantify the influence of one current over another. Yet despite 
difficulties in precisely capturing flow mechanics, one conclusion is clear-the 
combined hydraulic energy of two rivers moving together is greater than one 
moving alone. And so it is with convergence hydraulics. Making "claims of 
cause and effect must ... be qualified" because "many factors will be at play 
in the Court's decision to adopt a particular line of reasoning in any given 
case."25 Background traditions and principles "muddle attempts to casually 
attribute doctrinal change to borrowing or convergence per se."26 Yet the back-
and-forth borrowing undeniably creates energy that powers further doctrinal 
change. 
Of course, the hydraulic metaphor has limits. Doctrinal confluence may 
be like the confluence of rivers, but the presence of human actors distinguishes 
legal hydraulics from its watery analog in critical ways. For instance, the 
convergence dynamic is curiously self-generative; it "create [ s] ... [ a] tactical 
impetus to pursue further analogizing between the two doctrinal fields" and 
then "begets opportunities for its own enlargement."27 Water, by contrast, 
cannot power itself or fuel perpetual motion. More pertinent for my purposes, 
21. Yd. at 713-14. 
22. ld. at 714 (noting Justice Kennedy's Hudson concurrence "tracked ... closely the 
formulation for municipal liability that Justice O'Connor first articulated in the City of Canton 
concurrence that he had joined, and that the Court adopted in Brown"). 
23. ld. at 674. 
24. ld. 
25. Yd.at72l. 
26. ld. at 722. 
27. ld. at 723. 
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legal convergence is also deeply hermeneutic; it unfolds as legal actors "read 
around" in the intersecting domains, build their knowledge, and sharpen their 
capacity for different modes of reasoning.28 Quite obviously, real rivers flow 
independent of written discourse, argument, or interpretation. 
These limitations of water metaphors do not render them less useful. As 
Paul Ricoeur observes, "[w]ith metaphor, the innovation lies in the producing 
of a new semantic pertinence by means of an impertinent attribution."29 As I 
see it, Laurin's impertinence is both innovative and infectious as it relentlessly 
invites further cheekiness. In this spirit, then, I shall conclude by exploring 
how Laurin's dredging of exclusionary rule doctrine might be deepened by 
trawling for Herring in the waters of dissent. 
III. DISSENT AND COMPETING EXCLUSIONARY RULE SCHOOLS 
Attending to dissents helps explain Chief Justice Roberts's moves in 
Herring by foregrounding the centrality of competing schools of thought to the 
development of exclusionary rule doctrine. Certainly, Laurin alludes to such 
competing schools when she cites Justice Ginsburg'S Herring dissent as 
advocating a "more majestic conception" of the exclusionary rule.30 The 
majestic-conception school rejects deterrence as the sole justification for the 
exclusionary rule's constitutional necessity. Instead, this school understands 
the exclusionary rule as a "'constraint on the power of the sovereign, not 
merely on some of its agents. "'31 Per Justice Ginsburg, a major flaw in Chief 
Justice Roberts's refusal to require suppression in Herring's case was that it 
ensnared the judiciary in the "'taint of partnership in official lawlessness'" and 
allowed the government to "'profit from its lawless behavior. ",32 
In his Herring majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts quickly dismissed 
Justice Ginsburg and her allegiance to the majestic-conception school: 
"Majestic or not, our cases reject this conception ... and perhaps for this 
reason, her dissent relies almost exclusively on previous dissents to support its 
analysis."33 However, Chief Justice Roberts's attack on Justice Ginsburg's 
reliance on previous dissents seems unwarranted given the influence of 
dissents in advancing the teachings of his own exclusionary-rule-as-deterrence 
school of doctrine. As discussed above, Chief Justice Burger's dissent in 
Bivens and Justice White's dissent in Stone served as tributaries to the current 
that led to the adoption of the good faith exception in Leon. Chief Justice 
Roberts apparently forgot that the deterrence school has not always 
commanded a Court majority. 
28. ld. 
29. I Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, at ix (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer 
trans., 1990). 
30. Laurin, supra note 1, at 739 (citing Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 707 (2009) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting». 
31. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 
U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting». 
32. Yd. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, 1, 
dissenting) ). 
33. ld. at 700 n.2 (majority opinion) (internal citation omitted). 
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Figure 4 presents my own recovery of lineages animating Justice 
Ginsburg's philosophical debate with Chief Justice Roberts in Herring.34 Red 
34. In chronological order, the data points in Figure 4 are: 
(I) Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Weeks was a 9-0 decision. Justice Day 
delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court 
(2) Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Silverthorne was a 7-2 
decision. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court ChiefJustice White and Justice 
Pitney dissented without opinion. 
(3) People v. Defore, 140 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926). Judge Cardozo delivered the unanimous 
opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York. Of course, Defore is not a Supreme Court 
opinion, so the Y-axis position has no significance. 
(4) Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
For Wolfs vote breakdown, see supra note II. 
(5) Mapp, 367 U.S. 643. For Mapp's vote breakdown, see supra note 11. 
(6) Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). For Bivens's vote breakdown, see supra note I L 
(7) United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). For Calandra's vote breakdown, see 
supra note 11. 
(8) United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). For Leon's vote breakdown, see supra note 
11. 
(9) Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995). For Evans's vote breakdown, see supra note 14. 
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arrows connect opinions in the school advocating for an exclusively 
deterrence-based theory of the exclusionary rule while blue arrows connect 
opinions in the majestic-conception school. As I see it, the deterrence school 
did not wrest a majority until Justice Frankfurter's Wolf opinion in 1949. In 
holding that state courts did not need to suppress evidence obtained through 
umeasonable search or seizure, Wolf owed more to Judge Cardozo's legendary 
People v. Defore opinion penned for the New York Court of Appeals than to 
earlier Supreme Court opinions like Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 
which automatically imposed exclusion to avoid, in Justice Holmes's words, 
"reduc[ing] the Fourth Amendment to a form of words."35 Of course, Mapp 
overruled Wolf in 1961 and the deterrence school did not return to majority 
rule until 1974's Calandra. 
Chief Justice Roberts's heavy reliance on Calandra and its downstream 
progeny should thus be viewed as hermeneutically connecting Herring to 
Justice Frankfurter's overruled Wolf opinion and to Chief Justice Burger's 
Bivens dissent. The uniting philosophy behind the opinions of Chief Justices 
Roberts and Burger and Justice Frankfurter is found in Defore, which jurists in 
this school inevitably cite.36 The most famous line from Defore perfectly 
defines the exclusionary rule outcome adherents to this school seek to avoid: 
"The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."37 The 
aphorism goes a long way towards explaining Chief Justice Roberts's 
culpability test and systemic negligence standard in Herring-suppression 
should not result from mere "blundering" of an individual "constable." The 
repeated borrowing from Judge Cardozo shows his influence over the current 
mainstream view of the exclusionary rule. 
CONCLUSION 
On June 16, 2011, the Court handed down Davis v. United States, in 
which six Justices joined the majority in holding that the exclusionary rule 
does not apply to searches conducted in "objectively reasonable reliance on 
binding appellate precedent" that is later overruled.38 In his opinion for the 
Court, Justice Alito strongly affirmed the viability of both Herring's 
heightened culpability test and its systemic negligence standard.39 In dissent, 
Justice Breyer tried in vain to characterize as "broad dicta" Herring's 
heightened culpability language and predicted that the Court's new '''good 
faith' exception will swallow the exclusionary rule.,,40 Of course, Professor 
Laurin perfectly predicted this result, and it further vindicates her convergence 
(10) Herring, 129 S. Ct. 695. For Herring's vote breakdown, see supra note 14. 
35. Silverthorne. 251 U.S. at 392. 
36. See Herring. 129 S. Ct. at 704 (quoting Defore, 150 N.E. at 587); Bivens. 403 U.S. at 
413 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Defore, 150 N.E. at 587); Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31 (citing the 
"[w]eighty testimony" of Cardozo's Defore opinion). 
37. Defore. 150 N.E. at 587. 
38. 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423-24 (2011). Davis was a 7-2 decision. Justice Alito delivered the 
opinion of the Court. Justice Sotomayor concurred in judgment only. Justice Breyer, with whom 
Justice Ginsburg joined, dissented. 
39. ld. at 2427-28. 
40. ld. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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and borrowing analysis.41 
Tn terms of the competing schools of thought, majority and dissent also 
invoked authority entirely consistent with the Figure 4 opinion map. With 
refreshing candor, Justice Alito admitted in Davis that the exclusively 
deterrence-based view of the exclusionary rule did not command a majority as 
late as 1971 and that the current focus on the "flagrancy of the police 
misconduct" in fact derives from "a line of cases" beginning with Leon.42 
Nodding to his school's tradition, Justice Alito once again closed by citing 
Judge Cardozo's "constable has blundered" line from Defore, this time 
quipping that a criminal should not go free "because the constable has 
scrupulously adhered to governing law.,,43 For his part, Justice Breyer 
continued the majestic-conception habit of citing previous dissents that treat 
the exclusionary rule as "'an essential auxiliary'" to the Fourth Amendment.44 
Perhaps most striking in this regard is Justice Breyer's direct invocation of 
Justice Murphy's classic line from his Wolf dissent: "Tn many circumstances, 
'there is but one alternative to the rule of exclusion. That is no sanction at 
all. ",45 Here, Justice Breyer reveals a deep appreciation for the origins of the 
exclusionary rule tradition he carries on. 
Though it may seem like ancient history, Wolf remains relevant to any 
complete understanding of contemporary exclusionary rule debates. Justice 
Frankfurter's Wolf opinion marked the first time since the exclusionary rule's 
debut in Weeks v. United States that a majority endorsed cleaving the 
suppression remedy from the Fourth Amendment right. Anticipating future 
exclusionary rule majorities, Frankfurter explicitly justified this cleaving of 
remedy from right on the existence of alternate civil remedies to deter police 
abuse.46 In his prescient Wolf dissent, Justice Murphy argued that the 
deterrence value of alternate remedies was "illusory" because such remedies 
required difficult-to-make showings ofmalice.47 Partially anticipating Laurin's 
critique, Justice Murphy also urged that the exclusionary remedy be viewed in 
the light of its essential relationship to background constitutional meaning.48 
While neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Ginsburg cited to the Wolf 
debate in their clashing Herring opinions, this absence does not mean those 
41. See Laurin, supra note I, at 730 ("This Essay's convergence thesis suggests that the 
Court would be likely to extend the logic of Herring to preclude application of the exclusionary 
rule in instances of Cant violations and similar 'mistake of law' scenarios."). 
42. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,911 (1984) and 
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1971), a case that did not advance a deterrence-based 
view of the exclusionary rule). 
43. Yd. at 2434 (citing People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926». 
44. ld. at 2440 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 707 
(2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting». 
45. Yd. at 2440 (quoting Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, .T., dissenting». 
46. See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 30 & n.l (observing that 'Jurisdictions which have rejected the 
Weeks doctrine have not left the right to privacy without other means of protection" and 
collecting case law and statutes providing civil remedies). 
47. ld. at 42-43 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
48. See id. at 44 ("Only by exclusion can we impress upon the zealous prosecutor that 
violation of the Constitution will do him no good. And only when that point is driven home can 
the prosecutor be expected to emphasize the importance of observing constitutional demands in 
his instructions to the police."). 
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opinions failed to contribute to the current flow of exclusionary rule doctrine. 
Indeed, Justice Breyer's citation in Davis to Justice Murphy's Wolf dissent 
proves as much. As this Response has emphasized, Supreme Court Justices do 
not always reveal the full lineages informing their opinions. Justice Alito's 
failure in Davis to cite to the Wolf majority does not mean Justice Frankfurter's 
opinion exercised no sway over the currently dominant school. As Laurin's 
trawling analysis shows, the absence of citation to constitutional tort cases in 
exclusionary rule decisions does not mean that the former opinions have not 
hermeneutically influenced the latter. Clearly, borrowing and convergence 
shaped exclusionary rule and constitutional tort doctrines beyond what formal 
invocations of authority would indicate. Building on this insight, I have argued 
that dissents also exert influence hermeneutically by articulating the teachings 
of competing doctrinal schools. Following Laurin's cue, I therefore suggest 
that "reading around" dissents is a productive way for scholars to comprehend 
the hydraulics of exclusionary rule doctrine. 
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